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There are 5 pirates.

A,B,C,D,and E.

A is the most senior pirate, E is the most junior pirate.

Each one of them are extremely inteligent, but greedy. VERY. GREEDY.

They are on a boat, and they are playing a game that divides 100 coins among them.

Everyone knows how the game is played.

Pirate A, being the senior pirate, gets to choose how to divide the coins.

He can say 20-20-20-20-20, but he is greedy, and he wants to max his wallet UP!

 

But dont get too cocky.

 

All the pirates get to vote. If the majority votes yes on the divide or if there is a tie (in which you will see how there shall be one in a few moments), the divide passes and each man gets his coins.

 

If the majority votes no, however...

Pirate A gets thrown off the ship and dies.

 

Pirate B, now, must decide how to divide the coins.

 

How will it turn out?

There is one universal answer to this riddle.

-MajikMicMath

 Apr 12, 2016
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A: 98 B: 0 C: 1 D: 0 E: 1 It might be expected intuitively that Pirate A will have to allocate little if any to himself for fear of being thrown overboard so that there are fewer pirates to share between. However, this is as far from the theoretical result as is possible. This is apparent if we work backwards: if all except D and E have been thrown overboard, D proposes 100 for himself and 0 for E. He has the casting vote, and so this is the allocation. If there are three left (C, D and E) C knows that D will offer E 0 in the next round; therefore, C has to offer E 1 coin in this round to make E vote with him, and get his allocation through. Therefore, when only three are left the allocation is C:99, D:0, E:1. If B, C, D and E remain, B knows this when he makes his decision. To avoid being thrown overboard, he can simply offer 1 to D. Because he has the casting vote, the support only by D is sufficient. Thus he proposes B:99, C:0, D:1, E:0. One might consider proposing B:99, C:0, D:0, E:1, as E knows he won't get more, if any, if he throws B overboard. But, as each pirate is eager to throw each other overboard, E would prefer to k**l B, to get the same amount of gold from C. Assuming A knows all these things, he can count on C and E's support for the following allocation, which is the final solution

 

 

 

And that, my friends, is how you answer a riddle...

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

You do it my looking it up cool

 Apr 12, 2016

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